Zombies

Here's a chilling little philosophical argument:

Zombies are exactly like us in all physical respects but have no conscious experiences: by definition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies behave like us, and some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness. This disconcerting fantasy helps to make the problem of phenomenal consciousness vivid, especially as a problem for physicalism.

The question arises if zombies are even "conceivable". It is apparently not enough (I'm not a philosopher) to say "we're talking about them, aren't we?" "Conceivable" looks like a term of art that requires some form of logical consistency - but this doesn't feel right to me. My ignorance is peeking out....

The rest of the entry is pretty interesting, but most interesting was this: if zombies can exist and be exactly like us in all physical respects - undetectably - then it's hard to see how consciousness can have any effect on the physical world. On the other hand, if zombies can't exist, so that any creature that physically matches us in all respects must be conscious as we are, then consciousness is a purely physical phenomenon.

Ugh...more thought needed....and more brains...brains...brains....

- posted by Scott @ 6:56 PM